



319, 325 (1989). Claims lack an arguable basis in law or fact if they contain factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional, or if they are based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless. *Id.* at 327-28; *Brown v. Bagerly*, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); *see also Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990). Although *pro se* complaints are to be construed liberally by the courts, *see Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), under the PLRA, “courts have no discretion in permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to avoid a *sua sponte* dismissal,” *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).

As noted *supra*, the plaintiff names the Montgomery County Jail as the sole defendant to this action. “Persons” exposed to legal liability under § 1983 include municipal corporations and other “bodies politic and corporate.” *Mumford v. Basinski*, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997), *cert denied*, 522 U.S. 914 (1997)(citing *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 688 (1978) and *Foster v. Walsh*, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988)(*per curiam*).

Sheriffs’ offices and police departments are not bodies politic. As such, they are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. *See Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio* 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007)(a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity that can be sued under § 1983); *Matthews v. Jones*, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994)(a police department is not a person for purposes of § 1983); *Timberlake by Timberlake v. Benton*, 786 F.Supp. 676, 682-83 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)(police departments are not persons within the meaning of § 1983).


Just as sheriffs’ offices and police departments are not persons for purpose of § 1983, jails and prisons also are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. *See Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison*, 426 F.Supp. 271, 274 (D.C. Pa. 1976); *Marsden v. Fed. BOP*, 856 F.Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); *Powell v. Cook County Jail*, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993); *McCoy v.*

*Chesapeake Corr'l Ctr.*, 788 F Supp 890, 893-894 (E.D.Va.1992). In naming the Montgomery County Jail as the sole defendant to this action, the plaintiff has failed to establish the second part of the two-part test under *Parratt, supra* at p. 1.

Giving this *pro se* pleading a liberal construction, the Court could construe the complaint as an attempt to state a claim against the County of Montgomery, the political entity responsible for operating the Montgomery County Jail. However, for the County of Montgomery itself to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff would have to allege and show that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the county. *Monell*, 436 U S 689-690. The plaintiff makes no such allegation, nor can such an allegation be inferred from the complaint. Consequently, the allegations against the Montgomery County Jail cannot be imputed to the County of Montgomery.

For the reasons explained above, the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Therefore, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

  
Todd Campbell  
United States District Judge